be developed markets in assessing the effect of a secondary use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 23 Legal justifications for fair use have varied over time. Once grounded in free speech protections and user needs for re-expression, 24 judgments on fair use now often focus on market failures that can be implicated when parties try to exchange rights through bilateral transaction. Two academic articles contributed to this transformation of outlook in American law. When negotiations are costless, wrote Nobel Laureate R.H. Coase in 1960, 25 unregulated contestants could be trusted to efficiently resolve disputes through bilateral bargaining without need for court involvement. 26 However, the ability of the market to produce desirable transactions is diminished when negotiation is costly, or when benefits or harms may affect a wide group of third parties who are not represented in the immediate negotiation by buyer and seller.
When exchange benefits (or externalities) may redound to third parties or the public-at-large, economists speak of the outcome as an example of market failure because these additional benefits of exchange are generally ignored by the buyer and seller. Under market failure, both courts and statutes may at times define relevant property rights in order to accommodate exchange. These appointments would primarily include who may own, who may use, and what may be traded in an expedited market. More specifically, Courts may facilitate transfer by establishing fees that reflect the costs and values of contested property rights, or market benchmarks that are based on reasonable considerations in adjacent markets. They may also establish the rules under which enabling institutions operate. Facilitating outcomes with liability rules would contrast with a pure free exchange solution that would be efficient if the costs of representation were lower. 27 The idea of market failure crashed the copyright party in 1982, when Wendy Gordon related the concept to the application of fair use in a copyright defense. In a seminal article, Prof. Gordon argued that: 23 Texaco, infra note 41. Furthermore, "to negate fair use, one need only show that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work'." Harper and Row, supra note 10, 471 U.S. at 568, 105 S. (1960) . 26 The underlying theory being that the owner of the more valued right may capture the use privilege by compensating the other party for her loss, while having enough left over for himself. 27 The distinction between property and liability rules first appears in G. Calabresi and D. Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) .
"An economic justification for depriving a copyright owner of this market entitlement exists only when the possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in some way. Only where the desired transfer of resource use is unlikely to take place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market flaws impair the market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should be allocated, is there an economic need for allowing nonconsensual transfer. Thus, one of the necessary preconditions for premising fair use on economic grounds is that market failure must be present." 28 In addition to bargaining difficulties, 29 Gordon relates market failure to externalities 30 and the inability of bilateral exchange sometimes to account appropriately for social values related to the common good.
31
The insights of Coase and Gordon advance in the "new institutional economics" of Robert Merges, 32 who further understands the connection between property rights and market institutions. When transactions costs are high, clearly defined property rights may be a key factor in drawing in new participants and stabilizing their subsequent operation; private and quasi-public institutions may then emerge and evolve to facilitate new forms 28 W. J. Gordon, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors", 82 COL. L. REV. 1600 (1982) . The author continues: "Only where the desired transfer of resource use is unlikely to take place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market flaws impair the market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should be allocated, is there an economic need for allowing nonconcensual transfer." At 1615. A similar point is made by W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law", 18 J. OF LEG. STUD. 325, 357 (1989) . . 29 Id., 1628-30. 30 Id., 1630-2. "In cases of externalities, the potential user may wish to produce socially meritorious new works by using some of the copyright owner's material, yet be unable to purchase permission because the market structure prevents him from being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized.." At 1631. 31 Id., 1631. "Distrust of the market may also be triggered when defendant's activities involve social values that are not easily monetized. When defendant's use contributes something of importance to public knowledge, political debate, or human health, it may be difficult to state the social worth of that contribution as a dollar figure." of exchange. To compensate right owners, licensing agencies (which may include copyright collectives, rights clearance organizations, and "one stops" 33 ) negotiate contracts, monitor use, and collect royalties for a multitude of uses.
However, if players are to be attracted to form agencies and other institutional safeguards that would accommodate licensing, clear and marketable property rights, ab initio, must be established. "To persuade users to proceed through the device, copyright owners might well need a judicial declaration that the uncompensated use, previously minor and left unfettered, constituted an infringement of copyright." 34 In this representation, fair use, if too broadly applied, could sap the incentive to develop the requisite market institutions that might otherwise reduce transactions costs. 35 If transactions are not facilitated, reproduction and performance rights themselves may be misappropriated or mired in a swamp of negotiations. Or disputes could be left to the continued jurisdiction of Courts to rehash in "all or nothing" hearings that implicate the choice of injunctions and fair use.
Helping Markets Work: American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.
A strong defense of market forces in copyright law appeared in 1995 in the Second Circuit decision, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 36 Plaintiffs and 82 other publishers of scientific journals brought a class action suit against Texaco, whose 400 to 500 scientists had routinely engaged in unauthorized photocopying of copyrighted journals during professional research. Texaco claimed that photocopying for scientific purposes was fair use. Judge Pierre Leval in the District Court disagreed, 37 and the Circuit Court upheld his decision.
38
Based on the monitored activities of a stipulated researcher, the Circuit Court held that copying at Texaco was often used to provide each scientist with her own personal copies of articles without her needing to buy multiple subscriptions to particular scientific journals. 39 Adopting the District Court's reasoning, the Circuit Court held that 33 Copyright collectives negotiate contracts on behalf of their rights holders. Rights clearance centers grant licenses based on individual terms specified by the owner. "One-stop-shops" are a coalition of separate collective management organizations which offer a centralized source for a number of related rights that would be particularly useful in multimedia production. Texaco's uses then failed the crucial first criterion for fair use that had been established in Section 107.
The higher court also adopted the District Court's concept of market harm. Copying of articles admittedly had ambiguous effects in possibly stimulating or displacing subscriptions to the affected journal 41 and "there is neither a traditional market or clearly defined market value for individual articles." 42 Grasping the dynamic implications for market institutions, "this distinctive arrangement raises novel questions concerning the significance of the publishers' establishment of an innovative licensing scheme for the photocopying of individual journal articles." 43 However, "as a general matter, a copyright holder is entitled to demand a royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work … and the impact on potential licensing revenues is a proper subject for consideration in assessing the fourth factor." 44 In this regard, the economic impact of the plaintiff's loss of an opportunity to sell rights to a derivative work is distinguished from a market substitution that directly competes with the original. 45 The District Court listed the licensing procedures that could be used to obtain authorization and compensate publishers: direct publisher licensing, document delivery, and licenses obtained from the Copyright Clearance Center. 46 The decision recognizes how market institutions can be designed to facilitate the transfer of rights when transaction costs are high or market exchange is otherwise difficult. That is, the publishers "have created, primarily through the Copyright Clearance Center, a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies of individual articles via photocopying."
47 "Whatever the situation may have been previously, before the development of a market for institutional users to obtain licenses to photocopy articles, it is now appropriate to consider the loss of 40 49 which held in 1973 that photocopying by the defendants National Institute of Health and National Library of Medicine was fair use because it was unclear "whether a … clearinghouse system can be developed without legislation, and if so whether it would be desirable." 50 Chief Judge Cowen here presented a noteworthy dissent, arguing instead that a plaintiff award "may very well lead to a satisfactory agreement between the parties for a continuation of the photocopying by the defendant upon payment of a reasonable royalty to plaintiff." 51 Cowen argued that the majority opinion premised its conclusion on the assumption that key medical uses of photocopying would otherwise cease entirely or face a high risk that no market institution would evolve to disseminate the copyrighted works.
52
The Texaco Court would have agreed with Cowen that facilitating market institutions may emerge when Congress and the Courts move to affirm adjacent property rights. The court suggests that the emergence of the CCC may be due to Congress, which had suggested that an efficient mechanism be necessarily established for licensing in the photocopying market. 53 Now upheld by Courts, the continuing success and adaptability of the CCC, and other licensing agencies, to accommodate exchange is considerable.
The CCC, which continues to provide blanket licenses that provide unlimited rights to text reproductions, now offers transactional services for its catalog of 1.75 million text works. 54 The Center, which has licensed academic course packs since 1991, has accommodated electronic course packs since 1997. 55 Moving out further, 48 Supra note 36.
49 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 50 Id., at 1360-61. The majority declined to consider author willingness to license and doubted if a clearinghouse system could be developed without legislation. It further questioned whether it would be desirable in the first place. At 1360, n. 24. 51 Id., at 1372 (C.J. Cowen dissenting). 52 Id., at 1371. "The court … concludes that a judgment for plaintiff would lead to [the end of photocopying at the medical libraries]. It is not altogether clear to me how the court arrives at the second conclusion, and I think it is based on unwarranted assumptions." At 1371. see also (1964) . Irving Berlin unsuccessfully sued the publishers of Mad Magazine for printing fictional lyrics to the melodies of famous Berlin songs. "It is clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the original, and where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work that is necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of a satire, a finding of infringement would be improper." At 58 62 Id., 58.
1976, Congress listed parody as an example "of the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use." 63 The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that parody is a potential fair use subject to the four part test of Section 107. 64 However, "a humorous or satiric work deserves protection under the fair use doctrine only if the copied work is at least partly the target of the work in question [emphasis mine]" 65 ; there is otherwise no need to "conjure up" 66 the original in order to borrow from it. 67 However, a parody does not immediately qualify for fair use; rather, the parody is judged appropriately by the four criteria of Section 107.
In Elsmere v. National Broadcasting Co., 68 fair use was granted to a parody of "I Love New York", entitled "I Love Sodom", which was used in connection with a televised skit that poked fun at ads for New York State tourism. While parody must take enough to conjure up a recognition of the original, the Court now made explicit room for a non-minimal taking:
"Parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original in order to make its humorous point … Even more extensive use [than necessary to conjure up the original] would still be fair use, provided the parody [contributes] something new for humorous effect or commentary."
69
The issue reappeared in 1986 in a Ninth Circuit decision, Fisher v. Dees. 70 The case involved a parody of the song "When Sonny Gets Blue", entitled "When Sonny Sniffs Glue". The parody ran for 29 seconds and captured the main theme of the original by copying the first six of its 38 bars. The Circuit Court held that the parody qualified for fair use. 63 Supra note 8; historical and revision notes (1982 The judge's decision in Fisher v. Dees focused on the market failure that seems inherent in licensing a parody that ridicules an original. "Parodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied … even in exchange for a reasonable fee. The parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be bought." 71 Regarding market harm, the harm to a reputation or reduction in sales that results from brutal parody or criticism is appropriately excluded from economic cost to an author of a copyrighted work. 72 Rather, "The economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned is … whether it fulfills the demand for the original. The Court recognized that Campbell's use also bordered on an infringing derivative --a rap version of Oh Pretty Woman --that was itself not a parody. At first the Court seems to consider a comprehensive inquiry to all possible market harms in this regard; "the derivative market for rap music is a proper focus of enquiry. Evidence of substantial harm to it would weight against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals." 80 Furthermore, "we must consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market." 81 Nonetheless, the Court abbreviates its test, concluding that the only harm to the market "that need concern us … is the harm of market substitution. [emphasis mine]. It remanded to the District Court to consider these potential harms, noting that "there was no evidence that a potential rap market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parody, rap version."
82
Neither Fisher nor Campbell deployed the wider test of Texaco to consider the possible loss of licensing revenues beyond damages from direct substitution. 83 In Campbell, the transfer fee for a non-parodying rap use could have been related (though not necessarily equated) to the statutory mechanical fee that had been established for 77 Campbell, supra note 74, 578; citing Fisher, supra note 70. 78 Id., 591; citing Fisher, supra note 70, at 438. 79 Id., 592. 80 Id., 593. 81 Id. 82 Id.
83 Supra notes 36-41 and surrounding text. second reproductions of musical works. 84 Alternatively, arbitrators might have considered comparable license fees for other non-parodying uses.
If the statutory license can provide a starting point to establish a reasonable benchmark, it would seem that a market exchange of rights to "Oh Pretty Woman" could have been facilitated. Although parody itself is a defensible exercise in free speech, the particular use at hand is also a commercial undertaking that remunerated 2 Live Crew for their efforts. If Courts facilitate the transaction, it is not yet clear why the owners' right to receive payment for a commercial derivative should have been entirely voided.
By not imputing a license fee based on available standards, the Court failed to facilitate a market mechanism that could have been adapted to handle the situation. This type of analysis succumbs to an illusion of a static market that can be discerned and known for all of its potential, or lack of potential, to adopt to new property rights. However, market processes for transferring rights are not exogenous; they are themselves the resultants of previously enacted legal rules and social codes that condition human behavior. Facilitating institutions in market exchange can become more complex as their underlying rights become nuanced.
Parody vs. Satire
In contrast to the parody decisions, Courts have enjoined or punished producers of satires, or related works of a comedic/critical nature, that "conjured up" earlier copyrighted works to ridicule something other than the original. 85 Among others, Courts upheld copyright owners when sculptor Jeff Koons based themes in his art on photographs of Art Rogers, 86 Penguin Books published an O.J. Simpson takeoff on Dr. Seuss' "The Cat in the Hat", 87 Air Pirates satirized social values with characters from 84 In fact, if a label were to record a previously recorded song that had been legally distributed in the U.S., it may pay a statutory (or compulsory) mechanical license to the publisher for the right to make the reproduction. 17 U.S.C. 115. Statutory mechanical licenses for musical compositions are made available at rates arbitrated at the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. 801. With statutory licenses, secondary recordings of copyrighted works have guaranteed access to reproduce the song in an artistic manner that the publisher might not otherwise approve. 85 Parody has been defined "as a work in which the language or style of another work is closely imitated" and satire is a work which uses "wit, irony, or sarcasm for the purpose of exposing and discrediting vice or folly. Judge Souter distinguished parody and satire in Campbell. "Parody, which is directed toward a particular literary or artistic work, is distinguishable from satire, which more broadly addresses the institutions and mores of a slice of society."
91 He found the border between the two to be vague and their use co-extensive; "parody often shades into satire and a work can contain elements of both."
92 While admitting these ambiguities and overlaps, Souter then off-handedly dismisses satiric uses; i.e., the use of pre-existing works for satire may be done simply to "avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh."
93 Yet lest we think that only parody can win the day, 94 his note 14 would apparently allow a fair use for some satires. 95 With this Supreme Court precedent, contending parties in a parody case now face ambiguous standards that themselves be artfully "conjured up" to demonstrate whether a derivative work is a parody, a satire, or something else. From an economic perspective, a distinction in licensing procedures regarding parody and satire can be justified only if there is a market failure inherent in the licensing of one but not the other. 96 The distinction between the two here can seem contrived. The comedic criticisms of satire and parody would seem equally transformative and usurping of demand for the original. Regarding the difficulty of obtaining a license, the chances for obtaining a purely voluntary license for disseminating either a parody or a number of satires --particularly involving political content or cultural criticism -may be equally slim. 97 As a general matter, it is also questionable to contend that satirists denied access to one work may always find a suitable substitute among others.
98
The general public gains from satire, if anything, seem greater than in parody. There are profound benefits to be had when artists and writers can make use of recognized artifacts and icons to ridicule or criticize political institutions, cultural values, or media presentation. 99 From an economic perspective, these gains from social or political criticism are public benefits that cannot be appropriated in two-party exchange and not readily priced. 100 To widen opportunities for political expression and facilitate cultural exchange, 101 it would be beneficial to facilitate many of these satiric uses, which implicate critical dimensions that are no part of a directed parody. 102 It is difficult to understand how parodies that directly ridicule individual works would be of greater social importance. 96 Gordon, supra note 28. 99 Post-modern art (e.g., Jasper Johns' flags , Andy Warhol's soup cans) purposely appropriates recognized political and commercial images to make an artistic criticism of social values. As such, it represents a higher criticism that targets society more than the original work. "The referent in PostModern art is no longer nature, but the closed system of fabricated signs that make up our environment." N. A. Voegtli, "Rethinking Derivative Rights", 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213.
100
Gordon would include them as externalities; supra note 29, 1631. "If the defendant's interest impinges on a first amendment interest, relying upon the market may become particularly inappropriate; constitutional values are rarely well paid in the marketplace and, while the citizenry would not doubt be willing to pay to avoid losing such values, it is awkward at best to try to put a price on them."
To my mind, four points correctly summarize the actual costs of doing exchange of necessary rights to enable critical works. 103 First, it is difficult now to draw the line between a protected parody and all else. Second, copyright owners will not generally license transformative associations that a substantial number of people may find offensive, impolitic, or inartistic. Third, satirists and critical writers cannot always find suitable works which they may transform to enable social criticism and political attack. Finally, the right to take material for a satire will provide no additional disincentive to original creators, since the new work will not substitute for the original.
The Wind Done Gone
Returning to The Wind Done Gone, 104 the District Court opened its decision by recognizing that copyright owners for GWTW had administered a well-established market for licensed derivative works, including two remunerative licensed sequels that entailed the payment of substantial advances and royalties. 105 Comparing TWDG with the terms of the sequel licenses and considering a reasonable domain for acceptable "conjuring", the Court found that Ms. Randall's takings were excessive 106 and issued a preliminary injunction. The Court also found that the author's original intent extended to a general social and historical criticism of the American South that is beyond the domain of a work-critical parody.
107 Establishing the adaptability of sequel licenses, "the fair price to be paid for the right to publish a sequel to the work has already been set by two publishers who have agreed to pay, or paid, substantial advances and royalties for the right to create its sequels."
108
The Circuit Court agreed that takings of GWTW were substantial and that the first half of Ms. Randall's book was largely an "encapsulation of [GWTW that] exploits its 103 acknowledged the presence of a licensing market for sequels and other derivatives of TWDG. 119 However, rather than focus on the revenues that could have otherwise resulted from direct licensing, the Court ruled that SunTrust offered "little evidence or argument to demonstrate that TWDG would supplant demand for SunTrust's licensed derivatives." 120 [emphasis mine] The Court then refocused license opportunity from direct losses of licensing revenues to displaced licensing of other derivative works. Apparently rooted in the special nature of the parody, the Court's view of market harm from lost licensing opportunities is considerably narrower than Texaco. 121 Curiously, Courts in other high-profile cases last year were less reticent about acknowledging the potential for courts and legislators to provide equitable benchmarks in copyright cases where "all or nothing" choices implicated injunctions or fair use. 122 
Conclusion
In the 1999 Brace Lecture to the New York Chapter of the Copyright Society, Judge Alex Kozinski grasped the underlying economic reality of the copyright system and the need for defining marketable rights and enforcing institutions: "The premise behind copyright … is that the best way to promote production of valuable intellectual works is to give authors and inventors the ability to demand and receive compensation for the values they create…. The best way to do this is to grant property rights that give their products exchange value."
[emphasis mine]
Courts then may reasonably enforce property rights to lubricate exchange and facilitate the transactions of commercial works that are deemed "sufficiently transformative". This class of works may narrowly include all critical work (including parodies, satires, cultural criticisms, and critical references) where the borrowed material is not reasonably interchangeable with other copyrighted works. 126 More arguably, facilitated uses may include any creative transformation that is sufficiently different from its copyrighted predecessor so that market displacement is not credible. 127 The transfer of rights can be expedited by appointing an arbitrator to impose fees based on comparable transactions. 128 Alternatively, compensation can be determined by an action of a U.S.District Court, as is now the case for public domain works restored under copyright protection.
129 under e Such an approach would guarantee a transformative user the necessary legal access to copyrighted materials, and guarantee a copyright owner fair compensation for takings of his work. As in Judge Cowen's dissent, an enforcement of property rights would create the appropriate landscape for the necessary facilitating institutions to expedite transfer.
A number of uses may go badly compensated for lack of a good benchmark or other relevant evidence (although this would seem preferable to zero compensation). However, this vacuum will have opportunity to fill out only if the Courts enforce exchangeable property rights in adjacent markets. This would provide the greatest opportunity and incentive for owners and agents to "thicken" their licensing operations and produce the greatest number of comparable standards for any dispute. 130 As an option that may avoid individual arbitrage and facilitate thin markets, rights owners --or their collective agents --can sign blanket contracts with publishers that indemnify them against possible transformative infringements.
There are six considerations why licensing arbitration is preferable to the existing "all or nothing" regime of injunction or fair use in the broader area of critical or transformative work:
1. Rules that now enforce injunctions, limit free speech, and impose punitive damages can be vacated. 131 Instead of enjoining expression, Courts may expedite the production and dissemination of a wider domain of works. This would promote synergies among works that may achieve a wider critical or transformative use than ridiculing one another.
2. To the greatest degree possible, owners of intellectual property are guaranteed compensation, while others are enabled to produce more. Contending parties may then avoid gamesmanship of indeterminate win-lose games. Instead of fighting zero-sum gladiatorial contests, contending parties will have more incentive to negotiate to arrive at mutually accommodative solutions so that the court does not have to.
3. Creative incentives are greater when the uncertainty of an injunction can be eliminated. Prospective creators can more openly make use of appropriate material if they know that their eventual product will not be enjoined.
4. Free takings are allowed only after all possible measurements for fair compensation are exhausted. This confines free taking to specific instances where the consequences of market failure are confirmed to be truly higher.
5. By supporting marketable rights, we also empower collecting societies, licensing agencies, negotiating agents, and other expediting institutions to play in the market. These institutions may accommodate negotiation, new licenses, or online interaction, and reduce the need for ongoing court involvement.
6. If particular reuses of copyrighted material (e.g., Internet pornography) are to be stopped, this can be done legislatively with open debate and Supreme Court protections of First Amendment. Equitable rules can be established for all inappropriate uses that would admit no surrounding penumbra of excuse for a parody exemption.
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The Copyright Clause was intended "to be the engine of free expression." Harper & Row, supra note 10. As much as any other injunction on personal freedom, copyright injunctions that restrict speech deserve the strictest scrutiny. M. A. Lemley and E. Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
